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a bstr act  The purpose of this article is to critically address a widespread 
assumption that reads like this: Works of art that make use of digital media auto-
matically, through interactivity, are generally better suited for generating demo-
cratic processes in society than other art forms or phenomena that do not make 
use of digital media, and, therefore, digital art is more avant-garde than other art 
forms. By analysing the chains of equivalence underlying this assumption the ar-
ticle presents and discusses a number of issues that, taken together, render this 
assumption fallacious. 
k ey wor ds  Digital art, avantgarde, politics
It is often claimed that in digital art commands, formula and process 
have replaced contemplations, objects and completions, and that inter-
activity holds a key position in digital art. Thus it is with specific refer-
ence to interactivity that a link between digital art and avant-garde is 
explicitly promoted by among others Peter Weibel and Lars Qvortrup. 
Both argue that the computer medium, because of its interactivity, plays 
a leading role in interactive contemporary art that focuses on process 
rather than art object, and hence transforms the viewer to a user who 
actively participates in the work. As Weibel puts it: 
Contemporary avant-garde artists respond sensitively to social changes by 
changing the structure of their approach to their work and entering into new 
alliances with new forms of enactment […] The technical arts, the computing 
arts, play the pivotal role here […] As instruction for action qua artwork, art 
finally becomes a civil democratic medium.1
According to Weibel, the computing arts play such a pivotal role because 
they are emancipating as well as democratic, and he compares the situ-
ation today with that of the Enlightenment, which he presents like this:
The lower classes have less the arts to thank for their emancipation and more 
the natural sciences and the spirit of the Enlightenment, which set out to free 
humans from the social power exercised by the shackles of disenfranchise-
ment forged by the aristocracy and the church and from the power of nature 
[…] We are in a similar position today. The intention is to extend and advance 
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the spheres of democracy, by again allying them with the natural sciences 
through the agency of the mechanical and digital media arts, and in this way, 
with the help of the artificial appliances provided by new technologies and 
procedures, to create platforms and practices for democratic processes.2 
But why should mechanical and digital media art be better suited for 
generating emancipatory and democratic processes than, for instance, 
books or paintings? The reason is the widespread idea that digital art 
is automatically more interactive than non-digital art – an idea that is 
presented among others by Christiane Paul and by Lars Qvortrup who, 
like Weibel, compare digital art to the avant-garde movements from the 
beginning of the 20th century. 
Though Qvortrup acknowledges that the computer cannot realise the 
avant-garde goal of subverting existing social power structures, he nev-
ertheless argues that the computer is a medium that ‘corresponds to the 
dreams of the avant-garde, because the computer is interactive. [Where-
as] a poem is not well suited for hitting people in the head […] digital art 
is different from analogue art. The digital medium renders it possible to 
create a fictional world that the user can enter and act in’.3
Likewise Christiane Paul states that: 
‘The digital medium’s distinguishing features certainly constitute a distinct 
form of aesthetics: it is interactive, participatory, dynamic, and customizable, 
to name just a few of its key characteristics. […] While the user’s or participant’s 
involvement with a work has been explored in performance art, happenings, 
and video art, we are now confronted with complex possibilities of remote and 
immediate intervention that are unique to the digital medium.4
So the assumption presented by, among others, Weibel, Paul and Qvor-
trup looks roughly like this: ‘Digital art is avant-garde because it makes 
use of digital media/technologies, which automatically prompt interac-
tive, participatory art, which on its part automatically prompts a partici-
patory democratic society.’ But the logic behind this assumption is falla-
cious for a number of reasons, of which the following will account for six 











Some of the above points seem to be almost similar (for instance point 
4, 5, and 6), but as the following analyses will demonstrate, terminologi-
cal differences are of significance since terminological confusions are 
the results of, or tend to cause, erroneous assumptions like the one this 
article is addressing. 
I
First of all, it is a conspicuous fact that formalistic avant-garde is not iden-
tical to social avant-garde. To understand the avant-garde dimension of 
digital art it is beneficial to look into the definition of digital art, since the 
problems start to some extent at the attempts to coin such a definition. 
Since digital computer technology is everywhere today, it takes more for 
a work to be termed ‘digital art’, than the artist having utilized any kind 
of digital computer technology in the process of creating the work – that 
would include for instance digital photography, which is today not com-
monly considered digital art. Consequently, Christiane Paul, in her book 
Digital Art, distinguishes between the use of digital computer technology 
in art as a tool and as a medium. Whereas digital computer technology as 
a tool covers digital photography among other things, ‘the employment 
of digital technologies as an artistic medium implies that the work exclu-
sively uses the digital platform from production to presentation, and that 
it exhibits and explores that platform’s inherent possibilities’.5
Thus, unlike works that accidentally make use of digital computer tech-
nology at some stage(s) from production to presentation, so-called digital 
art, according to Paul’s logic, extensively operates by use of digital comput-
er technology in the whole spectrum from production to presentation and, 
at the same time, displays an engagement in digital computer technology 
in its contents. This double-coined definition of digital art is supported by 
other practitioners and theorists in the field, like Mark Tribe, who defines 
digital art as ‘work that both makes use of digital technologies and is con-
cerned with their cultural, political, and aesthetic significance’,6 and Søren 
Pold, who describes net art (but also implicitly digital art) as ‘an art form 
that in its form as well as in its content thematises digitalization’.7 
According to this way of defining ‘digital art’, what separates it from 
‘art’ in general is, thus, a matter of material form as well as thematic 
content. This double definition seems to unite two opposed avant-garde 
theories of the twentieth century in an odd manner – that is on the one 
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hand a formalistic avant-garde theory which insists on the pure medium 
(represented by Clement Greenberg among others), and on the other a 
theory focused on art’s ideological and political potentials in society in 
general (represented by Peter Bürger among others).
The demand that digital art must make use of digital computer technol-
ogy follows the line of Greenberg’s credo that ‘It is by virtue of its medium 
that each art is unique and strictly itself. To restore the identity of an art 
the opacity of its medium must be emphasized’.8 The additional request, 
however, that digital art must address the socio-cultural relevance of digi-
tal computer technology, is in accordance with Bürger’s analysis of the aim 
of the historic avant-gardes ‘to reintegrate art into the praxis of life’.9 
Neither Greenberg nor Bürger, however, is referred to when scholars con-
sider digital art to be avant-garde. The idea that digital art possesses par-
ticular avant-garde characteristics has been promoted by a number of theo-
rists in the field who all link digital art to the cybernetic neo-avant-garde of 
the 1960s in the sense that digital art (or computer art) stems directly from 
the 1960s’ experiments with and focus on systems and process rather than 
the work of art as a final result.10 In other words: the computational charac-
ter of works by Sol Lewitt, John Cage and mail artists among others, is seen 
as foregrounding digital art today, which is then termed ‘avant-garde’. If 
the term avant-garde is understood literally as a vanguard, leading the way 
into new territory, then the digital avant-garde is not in any way a new so-
cial territory, attempting to subvert existing power structures, since these 
have already embraced cybernetic thinking at that time.11 Consequently 
Hans Magnus Enzensberger in 1970 termed this line of artistic experiment 
an ‘apolitical avant-garde’, which ‘has found its ventriloquist and prophet 
in Marshall McLuhan, an author who admittedly lacks any analytical cat-
egories for the understanding of social processes’.12 
II
It seems unnecessary to point out the fact that ‘technology’, ‘medium’, and 
‘art’ are not identical concepts. Nevertheless a sliding between digital ‘art’ 
and digital ‘technology’, and between digital ‘art’ and digital ‘medium’ is 
present in the above quotes by Weibel, Qvortrup and Paul. Though design-
projects often move across traditional institutional boundaries, the con-
cepts of ‘technology’, ‘medium’ and ‘art’ should not be confused, as they 
work on different levels, which media theorist Lars Elleström has lucidly 
argued. Elleström’s ideas are helpful when differing between the different 
roles which digital technology can play in works of art, since he distin-
guishes between materiality and perception, which is where the slidings in 
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the above quotes seem to happen. Elleström distinguishes between basic 
media, qualified media, and technical media in the following manner:
Basic media are the concrete media impressions that we encounter 
through perception. Thus, in the case of a painting it consists on a level of 
basic media ‘of paint on a two-dimensional (or weakly three-dimensional) 
surface that can be seen (and to a lesser degree felt and smelled). Generally, 
the iconic signs dominate. The iconic signs, together with conventions for 
representation, very often make us perceive virtual space in the depiction’.13 
Qualified media, on the other hand, result from historical, social and 
cultural habitudes that, in the example of the painting, means that 
In order to be counted as a painting instead of only paint spread around, how-
ever, the picture must be produced and presented within generally accepted 
social and artistic frames and it should have some aesthetic qualities. None of 
these qualifying aspects are truly stable, though. Like all art forms and other 
qualified media, the nature of ‘painting’ can only be circumscribed ad hoc.14
Any accepted art form can therefore be considered a qualified medium 
even though it consists of basis medial modalities. This definition of 
qualified medium is in accordance with the widely accepted institutional 
theory of art, according to which art is defined by institutional affilia-
tion.15 Put otherwise: If it is accepted as art by the professional art insti-
tutional framework, then it is art.
Technical medium is what concretely realises basic and qualified me-
dia, in so far as without technical media the basic media and qualified 
media are nothing but abstract concepts. Canvas and paint are techni-
cal media that render possible painting as basic medium and (fine art) 
‘painting’ as qualified medium.
It does not make sense to definitively classify certain media as basic, 
qualified or technical, since media can mediate and represent each other. 
Instead, we should consider basic, qualified, and technical media as dif-
ferent media roles. For instance: 
Seeing a representation of a book on the screen has very little in common with 
interacting with a real book since the technical medium book is not mediated. 
However, the basic media that a book can mediate – certain visual texts and 
still images – can also be mediated very well by the television screen. […] To put 
it more straightforwardly, the technical medium ‘television set’ mediates the 
qualified medium ‘television program’ that represents the technical medium 
‘book’ that mediates the basic medium (visual, verbal, static) ‘text’.16 
Elleström’s distinctions allow us to recognize the different levels on which 
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‘the digital’ can occur in art, and – most importantly – to distinguish be-
tween them, in order to use the terms more precisely than is often the case. 
Part of the reason that such slidings are often at work in writings on 
digital art may be that this field is rather heterogeneous in the sense that 
practical and theoretical discourses are deeply intertwined. The primary 
platform for showing and discussing digital art is the festival, which 
combines exhibitions, concerts, conferences, performances, club nights 
etc. in a period of a few days, and many actors in the field carry multiple 
identities as artists/engineers/theorists/computer scientist etc. This cre-
ates fruitful cross-disciplinary collaborations that are able to transgress 
traditional demarcation lines between art forms and between practice 
and theory. But it also means that finding a common vocabulary is nei-
ther easy nor, perhaps, important. 
If, however, we want to discuss how, or whether, digital art differs 
from contemporary art in general, terminological precision is needed. 
So whereas it makes sense that artistic practices of digital art should de-
velop new creative cross-fertilisations, then academic writings on digital 
art should aim to describe, analyse and discuss such artistic practices in 
a manner that actually makes the field accessible to a broader audience of 
academia, who are not necessarily familiar with or subscribe to the (un-
spoken) assumptions of the academic ‘insiders’ of digital art. Clari fying 
the concepts of this field and their connections and intertwinements 
allows approaches from different academic disciplines to contribute to 
discussions on digital art, and hence potentially further academic cross-
fertilisations similar to the artistic ones in the field. 
III
A third count that opposes the fallacious assumption that digital media = 
interaction = democracy = avant-garde is that ‘interactive art’ is not automat-
ically collaborative. Under the heading ‘The Myth of Interactivity’, which 
has inspired the title of this article, new media theorist Lev Manovich ar-
gues that ‘In relation to computer-based media, the concept of interactivity 
is a tautology’ since ‘[o]nce an object is represented in a computer it auto-
matically becomes interactive’.17 Hence, the notion of interactivity should 
be qualified. Professor of systematic musicology Uwe Seifert defines inter-
action like this: ‘The concept of “interaction” is based on the definition of 
“to act upon”: Two different things interact if and only if each acts upon the 
other’.18 The two different things that interact in so-called digital art may be 
either machines or humans or interaction between machine and human. 
Often, works of art that are presented and discussed as ‘interactive’ are 
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in reality re-active – meaning that the work reacts in a pre-described man-
ner, which is the case when you click a link and a new webpage opens19 – or 
they are participatory – meaning that the work relies on user input in order 
to exist or be ‘complete’20, or their interactivity is solely systematic – mean-
ing that computors  or robotic devices interact with each other.21 Thus, a 
term like ‘interaction’ (or collaboration) are often applied in situations or 
works of art that incorporate merely ‘action’. From this follows that for a 
work of art to be collaborative it must allow people/audience/users to inter-
act with each other and not just individually with a computer. 
However, interactive works in the field of digital art very rarely allow 
for collaboration. At Ars Electronica, which is the oldest and most pres-
tigious festival for digital art, held annually in Linz in Austria, prizes 
are rewarded to works of art in different categories, one of which is the 
category of ‘Interactive art’. A closer look into the winners in the ‘Interac-
tive art’ category during the last 12 years curiously reveals that only one 
work (“Can you see me now?”) qualifies as collaboratively interactive in 
the sense that two humans act upon each other. 
ars electronic winners in the ‘interactive art’ category, 
2001–2012
Year Winning work Interactive dimensions
2001 “Polar”(Carsten Nicolai, 
Marko Peljhan)
Audience can enter the room, which 
changes light and sound output ac-
cording to audience input.
2002 “N-cha(n)t” (David Rokeby) Computers interacting with comput-
ers, receptive to audience input.
2003 “Can you see me now?” 
(Blast Theory, Mixed Reality 
Lab)
Online players and runners in the 
street, participating in a ‘chase and 
catch’ game. Interaction between 
‘artists’ and players.
2004 “Listening Post”(Ben Rubin, 
Mark H. Hansen)
Installation collecting and manip-
ulating input from users of the 
Internet. The audience witness the 
installation’s output.
2005 “MILKproject” (Ieva Auzina, 
Esther Polak, RIXC – Riga 
Center for New Media 
Culture)
GPS-tracking of milk.
Audience can follow the route of the 
milk.
The Myth of Emancipation through Interaction
25
2006 “The Messenger” (Paul 
DeMarinis)
Receives input in the form of e-mails 
and generates an output.
2007 “Park View Hotel” (Ashok 
Sukumaran)
The work is re-active – responses 
to audience triggering a point-and-
shoot device.
 
2008 “Image Fulgurator” (Julius 
von Bismarck)
A device that alters photographs 
taken by random by-passers.
2009 “Nemo Observatorium” 
(Lawrence Malstaf)
One member of the audience can 
enter a cabin, where small pieces of 
Styrofoam are blown in a tornado-
like formation.
2010 “The EyeWriter” (Zach 
Lieberman, James Powderly, 
Tony Quan, Evan Roth, 
Chris Sugrue, and Theo 
Watson)
Enables a person (through robotic 
devices) to make graffiti on walls 
in urban space by using eye move-
ments only.
2011 “Newstweek” (Julian Oliver, 
Danja Vasiliev)
Hacks and modifies electronic news 
accessed in specific locations. Read-
ers of the fake news are unaware of 
the live human-computer interaction 
that takes place behind the scene.
2012 “Memopol-2” (Timo Toots) Collects and visualizes information 
on a person by reading that person’s 
ID-card.
At this stage it is important to stress that the lack of collaborative inter-
action does not in any way render the works of poorer artistic quality. 
The aim of this article is not to judge the artistic quality of specific works 
that make use of digital computer technology, but solely to present a criti-
cal analysis of a widespread fallacious assumption.  
IV
Just like interaction or participation is not automatically collaborative, 
nor are they assuredly democratic. Curator and art theorist Nicolas Bour-
riaud has promoted relations and human interactions as the essence of 
contemporary art.22 According to Bourriaud, the ability of works of art to 
create social interstices and micro-utopias in society has a political func-
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tion insofar as it implicitly liberates us from an (old-fashioned) prison 
of individual subjectivity by suggesting (new) inter-subjective commu-
nities. But the idea that art that stages inter-human interactions and 
relations has a positive political impact on society in general has been 
countered by other critics of contemporary art. Thus, art critic Hal Foster 
states that: ‘Sometimes politics are ascribed to such art on the basis of a 
shaky analogy between an open work and an inclusive society, as if a des-
ultory form might evoke a democratic community, or a non-hierarchical 
installation predict an egalitarian world.’23
The reason that open, participatory works cannot automatically be 
favoured to non-participatory works when attempting to create ‘politi-
cal’ or ‘democratic’ art, is that – as Claire Bishop has lucidly argued in 
her critique of Bourriaud’s idea of ‘Relational Aesthetics’ – democracy is 
characterized by conflictual relations; not by interactivity and participa-
tion as such. Bishop paraphrases Bourriaud’s idea that:
 ‘The interactivity of relational art is […] superior to optical contemplation of 
an object, which is assumed to be passive and disengaged, because the work of 
art is “social form” capable of producing positive, human relations. As a conse-
quence, the work is automatically political in implication and emancipatory in 
effect’.24 (Bishop (paraphrasing Bourriaud), p. 62, emphasis added.) 
Thus, according to this line of thought, which is often demonstrated in 
presentations of art that make use of digital technology, activating the 
audience is considered in itself to facilitate democratic processes regard-
less of whether participation is characterized by mutual agreement or 
dissensus. In order for democratic processes to be at work, however, an-
tagonism and conflict are required. As Bishops puts it, with reference 
to Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s work on political philosophy: 
‘a democratic society is one in which relations of conflict are sustained, 
not erased. Without antagonism there is only the imposed consensus of 
authoritarian order – a total suppression of debate and discussion, which 
is inimical to democracy.’25 
The point is that, while some interactive works of art display demo-
cratic conflict and other works promote un-problematic co-existence, 
there is no automatic logic linking interactivity or participation in gen-
eral with radical democracy. 
V
If interaction and participation in general cannot in itself assure demo-
cratic processes, perhaps (electronic) social media have a better chance? 
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The answer is ‘no’; social media are not automatically democratic. Obvi-
ously, social media like Facebook and Twitter have proved their demo-
cratic and even revolutionary potentials in the Middle East during the 
winter and spring of 2011. But the same social media are also to a great 
extent employed for personal updates that qualify as communication – 
often one-way communication – like ‘My cat just got kittens!’ or ‘I don’t 
like the dress that the minority leader wore in the debate on TV last night’. 
Activist and media theorist Franco Berardi has pointed out how the 
‘techno-informational universe’ has destroyed the ‘inter-human sensory 
film’ and led to a generation that is capable of interacting only though 
unequivocal and predetermined modes of connection, but who is insen-
sitive to conjunctions of slow, irregular or analogue modes.26 Thus rather 
than promoting democratic processes, Berardi sees digital technology as 
possessing the danger of being a biopolitical nightmare that controls our 
ability to engage in relations and issues that are not written into the be-
havioural code of the digital information society. According to Berardi, 
therefore, it is of great importance to be aware of the way digital culture 
shapes the function of our mind, and to attempt to interfere in this influ-
ence by alternative use of digital technology.
A somewhat similar point of view was presented in 1970 by Hans Mag-
nus Enzensberger, who paid attention to the two-edged ability of new tech-
nology when he argues that ‘wage-earners’ already owned tape-recorders 
and cameras, but they failed to apply these new technologies of media pro-
duction in places where social conflict existed – that was in schools, work-
places and in the offices of the bureaucracy. Instead, new technologies 
were used solely for leisure purposes.27 Thus, to Enzensberger the problem 
was not a lack of media production facilities in itself – the problem was 
that these facilities were not applied properly, as in social struggles, by the 
left wing. Consequently, Enzensberger distinguished between ‘repressive 
use of media’ and ‘emancipatory use of media’: 
Repressive use of media Emancipatory use of media
Centrally controlled programme Decentralized programme
One transmitter, many receivers Each receiver a potential transmitter
Immobilization of isolated individuals Mobilization of the masses
Passive consumer behaviour Interaction of those involved, feedback
Depoliticization A political learning process
Production by specialists Collective production




Two points in Enzensberger’s work are of relevance here: First, that 
new media technologies in themselves are neither repressive nor eman-
cipatory – it all depends on how and in what context they are put to use. 
And second, that, once again, passiveness is aligned with de-politiciza-
tion – and, one may add, alienation – whereas interactivity is aligned 
with participatory democracy. The latter point, however, is strongly con-
tested by the following, and final, issue in this article’s overall analysis.
VI
Using philosopher Jacques Rancière as a main point of reference, this 
section demonstrates why interaction or participation does not neces-
sarily have emancipating potentials. Rancière describes the relationship 
between emancipation and interactivity in his text “The Emancipated 
Spectator”. According to Rancière, artists or directors (as he writes mostly 
about theatre in the text) often operate with a dichotomy, like the one 
presented by Enzensberger, which turns out to be false. According to Ran-
cière, the problem with such dichotomies is that they operate with a su-
perior all-knowing, intelligent subject position of the ‘active’-side, who is 
capable of emancipating the inferior, less intelligent passive-side through 
interaction. But rather than thinking of the difference between passive 
spectator and active participant as a true hierarchy of intelligences, we 
should, according to Rancière, consider this difference to be merely one 
way of distributing the sensible, which may well be contested by other 
ways. This means that the value-laden judgements connected to each side 
of the dichotomy are not real, but are subject to (ideological) change. 
The aim, however, is not to make a 180 degrees turn that favours pas-
sivity over (inter)activity, but to release the chains of equivalence creat-
ing the dichotomy and, instead, insist on a sense of equality between 
different ways of relating to the world. As Rancière himself puts it: 
[Emancipation] begins when we dismiss the opposition between looking and 
acting and understand that the distribution of the visible itself is part of the 
configuration of domination and subjection. […] the principle of emancipation 
is the dissociation of cause and effect.29
Spectatorship is not a passivity that must be turned into activity. It is our nor-
mal situation. We learn and teach, we act and know, as spectators who link 
what they see with what they have seen and told, done and dreamed. There is 
no privileged medium, just as there is no privileged starting point.30
Artist David Rokeby, who was himself rewarded the Ars Electronica Prize 
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in the ‘Interactive art’ category in 2002, implicitly supports Rancière’s 
point in his statement that interactivity may actually work to fragment the 
user’s subjectivity rather than supporting it, because in art interactivity 
and participation is initiated and staged by the artist and not by the users 
themselves. According to Rokeby, what happens could be that: ‘We trade 
subjectivity for participation and the illusion of control; our control may 
appear absolute, but the domain of that control is externally defined.’31 In 
fact, the illusion of control, and perhaps even of political engagement, com-
pensate for the fact that we have in reality lost that control.32
Conclusion
This article started out by accounting for the assumption that ‘Digital art 
is avant-garde because it makes use of digital media/technologies, which 
automatically prompt interactive, participatory art, which on its part 
automatically prompts participatory democratic society’. Hopefully, the 
article has demonstrated why this assumption can be considered a myth 
rather than a truthful fact. Since the above analysis has been informed 
primarily by discourse theory in its attempt to contest a hegemonic as-
sumption by shedding light on its underlying chains of equivalence, it 
leaves us with the question of what potentials art that makes use of digi-
tal technology actually possess.
One characteristic feature of digital technology that transfers into the 
realm of many works is its ability to challenge traditional borders be-
tween qualified media. For instance, experiencing a work like Listening 
Post, from the above list of ‘Interactive art’ winners at Ars Electronica 
(2004), can be said to somehow incorporate reminiscences from or merge 
qualified media such as visual art, cinema, performance, and music with-
out being just one of them. Consequently, it fits the festival format of Ars 
Electronica perfectly, but even though Listening Post has, to a limited 
degree, been included by the institutions of traditional qualified media 
(it has been exhibited at art museums), it is now permanently installed 
at the Science Museum in London. Thus, many works (but not all) that 
make use of digital technology do so in a manner similar to the develop-
ment in popular media, which Henry Jenkins has termed ‘Convergence 
culture’, meaning that ‘old and new media will interact in ever more 
complex ways’ as opposed to ‘the digital revolution paradigm [which] 
presumed that new media would replace the old’.33 A work like Listening 
Post perfectly exemplifies a complex artistic convergence of interactivity 
(computer to computer and human to human in the chat room conversa-
tions, which the work taps into) and contemplation (the work’s audience 
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is passive), as well as digital (technical medium) and analogue (basic me-
dium). The discursive theoretical framings of works like Listening Post, 
however, tend to create from such convergences chains of equivalence 
between digital technology, interactive art and emancipation. But when 
talking about the emancipating or democratic potentials, or non-poten-
tials, of art, it makes very little sense to place certain technologies, media, 
or concepts in a privileged position – not even the notions of interactivity 
and collaboration. 
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